This paper considers the challenge of designing and verifying control protocols for geographically distributed railway interlocking systems. It describes how this challenge can be tackled by stepwise development and model checking of state transition system models in a new extension of the RAISE Specification Language.
Introduction
This paper considers the challenge of formally modelling and verifying the safety of the real-world geographically distributed railway interlocking system presented in [HP00] . The engineering concept of this was originally developed by INSY GmbH Berlin for their railway control system RELIS 2000 designed for local railway networks that are not highly frequented by trains and consist of a single line connecting a series of small, adjacent stations having one or two tracks.
Background
A railway interlocking system is a safety-critical system controlling the track side equipment and movement of trains in a railway network such that train collisions and derailments are avoided. Current computer-based interlocking systems usually have a centralised design, but in a few cases, as for instance described in [HP00, FH18] , the control has been geographically distributed to communicating processors deployed at the sensors and actuators (e.g. points) along the track layout and to onboard train control computers. One of the motivating factors for such distributed interlocking systems is the lower cost for track side installation and maintenance as signals and many copper cables are replaced by wireless communication. Furthermore, system configuration and thereby also the certification of system configurations is considerably simplified (and thereby also cheaper) as the configuration data of each control component along the track layout only depends on local (adjacent) track elements and the configuration data for a train control computer only depends on its own route, while the configuration of a centralised system in the form of a global route control table is very complex, cf. the discussion in [FGH + 16] . This in particular means that re-configuration due to network changes only requires small local changes in a few components for a distributed system, while the whole route control table for a centralised system must be completely recreated. These advantages make distributed interlocking systems an attractive solution, especially for small, local railway networks which can only operate if the costs for (re-)configuration, installation and maintenance of the system are low.
To verify the safety of distributed railway interlocking systems is even more challenging than for centralised systems. For centralised interlocking systems, there is a global notion of the state of the system, which can be observed by the control computer to make interlocking decisions. In contrast to this, in the geographically distributed approach where each train is equipped with a train control computer, and additional control components are distributed throughout the railway network, the interlocking data must be distributed (but also duplicated to some extent) in the different control components. Furthermore, the control components must collaborate in order to make safe decisions, so communication between the control computers must be introduced. This adds additional threats which would not be present in a centralised system. Hence, the distribution of control gives rise to new challenges for the safety verification.
Using formal methods for the verification of distributed interlocking systems is a natural choice, as formal methods are strongly recommended by the CENELEC standard EN 50128 [ECfES11] for safety-critical railway control components and have proved useful for many applications. For instance, Haxthausen and Peleska demonstrated this in [HP00] , where they modelled and verified the distributed interlocking system considered in this paper. For this they used the RAISE Specification Language (RSL) [RAI92] , and the RAISE theorem prover, respectively.
Theorem proving, as used in [HP00] , handles complex systems very well, but the proof derivation process is very time consuming, as it must be directed by a human. Furthermore, theorem provers are often unable to give counter-examples when a proof fails. With model checking, the verification process is fully automated, and if some asserted property is not satisfied in some state of the system, the model checking tool will produce a counter-example, usually showing the path to that state. The path can then be investigated in order to discover the unintended behaviour. Therefore, in this paper, we will investigate the use of model checking for verifying the safety of the considered interlocking system.
Contribution
The main contribution of the paper is a method for modelling and verifying a distributed system by stepwise specification and model checking, and the application of this method to a distributed railway interlocking system.
For the system specification the method uses a new extension of RSL, which we call RSL . We have built RSL on top of another extension of RSL, called RSL-SAL [PG07] , which allows to specify systems by state transition system models. RSL provides additional convenient language constructs, allowing the use of generic variables and named collections of transition rules. In contrast to this work, the work in [HP00] used the RSL process algebra to specify the final model of the system. The formal verification is now performed using the SAL symbolic model checker [SAL01] which is a back-end to the RAISE tool set rsltc [Geo03] supporting RSL-SAL and now also RSL . The challenge of capturing the system behaviour in appropriate detail was tackled by using stepwise development of state transition system models. This approach is novel in the context of RAISE.
Paper overview
First, Sect. 2 gives a brief introduction to the new language constructs of RSL and the new functionality of the RSL tools framework. The reader may skip this section. Then, Sect. 3 gives a brief introduction to the case study: the engineering concept of the considered distributed interlocking system and an overview of the formal development. The following sections (Sects. 4, 5 and 6) give an overview of the generic model specifications and the development steps between them. The verification of model instances is described in Sect. 7. Finally, Sect. 8 gives a conclusion and states ideas for future work.
Language constructs of RSL and added tool support
This section gives a short introduction to RSL which is used in this paper to create and instantiate generic specifications for system models of a distributed interlocking system. RSL is an extension to RSL-SAL, which itself is an extension to RSL. RSL is a wide-spectrum, formal specification language that enables the formulation of modular specifications in several different styles. RSL-SAL provides the possibility of specifying state transition systems in a guarded command style and later model checking properties of the systems using the SAL model checker.
We have extended the existing RSL-SAL specification language with new language constructs better suited for the specification of generic models. In particular, this extended version of RSL, which we call RSL , provides the possibility of declaring generic variables, generic constants, initialisation constraints, and naming collections of transition rules. Functionality supporting the use of these constructs in conjunction with the SAL model checker have been added to the RSL tools environment. We will elaborate on each these additions in the following.
Specifications in RSL
The specification of a transition system model in RSL consists of 1. Type declarations.
Stepwise development of interlocking systems 2. Value declarations (i.e. constants and functions). 3. Axioms. 4. (State) variable declarations. 5. An (optional) initialisation constraint on the variables. 6. A transition relation specification.
Declared types can be used in the value declarations and the variable declarations, and the declared values and variables can be used in axioms and in the initialisation constraint (if included) and in the transition relation.
Generic specifications in RSL
Interlocking systems are reconfigurable systems which can be instantiated by specifying configuration data, e.g., for the railway network which should be controlled. Therefore, it is natural to model an interlocking system as a generic model, that is, a model which abstracts away from the concrete configuration and which can later be instantiated with the desired configuration.
In RSL it is possible to abstract from concrete configuration data by using abstract types type T1
and underspecified constant values value v : T2 which can later be concretised by instantiating the types with concrete types, ty: type T1 ty and by instantiating the values with concrete values, val, either by adding val as in:
value v : T2 val or by adding an axiom:
axiom v val Furthermore, it is possible to abstract away from the initial values of variables by simply not specifying these. Later, during instantiation, the initial values can be added by specifying initialisation constraints.
In the following sections, some language constructs which ease the specification of generic transition system models, and which are helpful for the reader to know about, are introduced. Some of these language constructs are from the existing RSL-SAL, and some of them are new language constructs added in RSL . It will be noted in the section whether the language construct introduced is from RSL-SAL or RSL .
Notation for generic variables
In RSL we allow the declaration and referencing of so-called generic variables. The generic variables provide an elegant way of specifying that there exists a variable for each value of a given type. The declaration of a generic variable is thus a shorthand for a set of variable declarations. This is particularly useful when creating generic models of systems which may contain a set of similar entities for each of which some state variable(s) must be maintained.
Generic variables in RSL are declared by statements in the following form: where ta i is some actual value belonging to the type T 1 i over which the variable is defined.
We will show an example of the declaration of and reference to a generic variable. Suppose that we are specifying a system in which there is a configurable number of trains, each identified by a unique train identifier of the type TrainID. For each train we wish to keep track of its position. Suppose that a position is simply given by a single track segment of type SegmentID. We could then declare the following generic variable: variable position [ t : TrainID] : SegmentID This states that there exists a variable, position[ta], of type SegmentID for each value ta belonging to the type TrainID.
Now suppose that the type TrainID is an enumeration variant type declared as follows:
A reference to the specific instance of the generic variable associated with t1 could then be written as follows:
In our previously published work [GH18] , where we used RSL-SAL not providing generic variables, we had to make a work-around using the map RSL-construct, mapping component (e.g. train) identifiers to state values (such as a train's position), as follows:
variable position : TrainID → m SegmentID Using that work-around is less intuitive, as e.g., the train positions of all trains are stored in a single variable, and not in individual variables as it is the case for a real-world distributed system such as the one considered in this paper.
The addition in RSL of generic variables offers an elegant way of specifying state variables at the generic level. Additionally, using a dedicated construct makes it clearer for any readers which variables are generic.
Using generic variables (which can be unfolded to regular variables, cf. Sect. 2.8) is an advantage when translating to model checker input languages, as many of them do not support data structures such as maps.
Notation for initialisation constraints
In RSL , it is possible to initialise variables using an initialisation constraint. An initialisation constraint is a conjunction of basic initialisation constraints and quantified initialisation constraints. A basic initialisation constraint has the following form:
where v is a variable reference. (This variable reference may be a simple variable reference or a reference to an instance of a generic variable.)
A quantified initialisation constraint representing a conjunction over a set of constraints only differing by an index parameter t of finite type T, can be expressed as follows (here for a generic variable):
where v is a generic variable defined over the type T and t may occur in value expression. It is a shorthand for writing the conjunction of all constraints that can be obtained by substituting a value val of type T for t in the constraint, v [t] value expression.
Notation for generic constants
RSL supports generic constants similar to generic variables. Generic constants in RSL are declared by statements in the following form:
value generic const name[t 1 : T1 1 , . . ., t n : T1 n ] : T2 where val is some value of type T 2.
Notation for transition rules
In RSL-SAL, and thereby in RSL , transition rules are specified in a guarded command style. A basic transition rule has the following form:
where v i is the primed version of a variable reference, v i . The rule consists of a guard and an effect (separated by −→), where the guard is a predicate over the state variables determining for which states the effect of the rule can be applied, and the effect of the rule is a collection of state variable updates. In the state variable updates, primed versions of the variables refer to the variables in the resulting post state. Transition rules can be combined by non-deterministic choice ( ). Suppose two rules are combined by the non-deterministic choice operator:
Then the non-deterministic choice operator allows the effect of the first rule to take place if the guard, guard 1 evaluates to true. Similarly, the operator allows the effect of the second rule to take place if the guard, guard 2 evaluates to true. If both guard 1 and guard 2 evaluate to true, then a non-deterministic or "random" choice is made between the effect of the first rule and the effect of the second rule. A non-deterministic choice over a set of rules of the same form, only differing by a parameter t of finite type T , can be expressed as a quantified transition rule:
where t may occur in the value expressions and/or as an access parameter in the variable references v i , if v i is an instance of a generic variable. Such a rule is a shorthand for writing a non-deterministic choice between all rules that can be obtained by substituting a value val of type T for t in the rule, value expression −→ v 1 value expression 1 , . . . , v n value expression n .
In particular, a non-deterministic choice between updating different instances of a generic variable v defined over the type T, can be expressed as follows:
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Named collections of transition rules
RSL allows the naming of collections of transition rules. Named collections of transition rules provide a simple way of compartmentalising the specification into logical parts. A named collection of transition rules has the following form:
where each rule i is a transition rule (or the name of another named collection of transition rules 1 ). A collection of transition rules must consist of at least one (possibly quantified) rule.
The names of collections of transitions can be referred to in a system composition, which has the following form:
where each C i is the name of a collection of transition rules. Alternatively, it is possible for the system composition to combine a mix of names of collection of transition rules and just transition rules.
We now show an example of the declaration and usage of a named collection of transition rules. Suppose that we are specifying a system with trains, where an overall logical partition of the possible events in the system could be (1) rules related to moving the trains, (2) rules related to the trains making reservations for track sections, and (3) rules related to the locking of points in the tracks.
For this system, the collection of transition rules related to the moving of trains could be specified as follows (where the ellipsis indicate additional rules): Suppose that the collections of transition rules related to reservation and locking, respectively, were declared as named collections in a similar manner. Then, a system composition of the named collections of transitions could be declared as follows:
Notation for LTL properties
LTL properties in RSL-SAL (and RSL ) are logical value expressions where the temporal operators of LTL, G, F and X, are allowed as function symbols:
• G expresses "always" or "globally". • F expresses "eventually" or "in the future". • X expresses "in the next state".
A quantified property representing a set of properties only differing by a parameter t of finite type T , can be expressed as follows:
where t may occur in the value expression.
It is a shorthand for writing the conjunction of all properties that can be obtained by substituting a value val of type T for t in value expression.
Tool support
We have added tool support to the existing RAISE rsltc tool [Geo03] for the extensions of RSL introduced in Sects. 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, and 2.6. We have added syntax and type checking support for the constructs, and moreover, we have added an unfolder to the RSL framework. The extended rsltc tool for the RSL is free to use, and can be found online. 2 The unfolder takes as input a model specification in RSL and outputs a so-called unfolded model specification. In the unfolded model specification, the generic constructs have each been replaced with what they are shorthand for. Thus, the unfolded model specification is within the subset of RSL-SAL supported by the RSL to SAL translator (i.e. RSL-SAL). This allows us to continue using the translator, and thereby the SAL model checker as back-end.
The input model specification of the unfolder must be non-generic, i.e. it must be instantiated with concrete types and values, as these are used in the creation of the unfolded model specification.
Case study

Engineering concept
The control strategy of the system must ensure the safety of the system by preventing derailment and collision of trains. In this engineering concept, safety is achieved by only allowing one train on each track segment at the same time and ensuring that points are locked in correct position while trains are passing them. To this end, trains must reserve track segments before entering them and lock points in correct position before passing them.
The control components of the system are responsible for implementing the control strategy. Each train is equipped with a train control computer. In the railway network, several switchboxes are distributed, each associated with a single point or an endpoint of the network. These components communicate with each other in order to collaboratively control the system. Each control component has its own, local state space for keeping track of the relevant information. As can be seen from Fig. 1 , each of the train control computers has information about the train's route (a list of track segments) with its switchboxes, the train position, and the reservations and locks it has achieved. Each switchbox has information about its associated sensor (used to detect whether a train is passing the critical area close to the point), which segments are connected at its associated point (if any), for which train the point is locked (if any), and for which train each of the associated segments is reserved (if any). The basic idea of the control strategy is as follows:
1. Permission to enter a segment: For a train control computer (TCC) to decide whether it is legal to enter the next segment of its route, the TCC must observe its local state space and check whether it has the needed reservations and locks. More precisely, the following must hold: • the next segment must have been reserved for the train at the two upcoming switchboxes, and • the point must have been switched in the direction for the train route and locked for the train at the next switchbox.
In the scenario shown in Fig. 1 , for the train T 1, this means that it must have reservations for segment S 2 at both the switchboxes SB 1 and SB 2, and a lock for the point at SB 1, before it can be allowed to enter S 2. 2. Making reservations and locks: Reservations and locks are made by the trains by issuing requests to the relevant switchboxes. Depending on its local state, a switchbox may or may not comply with a request from a train. The switchbox can only fulfil a segment reservation request if the segment is not already reserved at the switchbox. Similarly, a switchbox can only lock a point (after potentially having switched the point in the direction for the train route), if the point is not already locked. Additionally, a request for locking a point can only be made if the train has reservations for the two segments in its route on either side of the point to be locked. In the scenario shown in Fig. 1 , for the train T 1, this means that it must have a reservation for segments S 1 and S 2 at the switchbox SB 1, before it can request to switch and lock the point at SB 1. If a switchbox can meet a request, it will update its state space accordingly. In any case, the switchbox will send a response to the train, based on which the train can determine whether the request has been met and, thereby, whether the train should update its state space as well. 3. Release of reservations and locks: When a train enters the critical area of a switchbox, the sensor associated with the switchbox will become active, and when the train later leaves the critical area of the switchbox, the sensor will become passive which in turn causes both the lock and reservations for that train at that switchbox to be released in the state space of the switchbox. When the train leaves the critical area of the switchbox, also the lock and reservations at that switchbox will be released in the state space of the train.
Overview of formal development
The modelling process follows a stepwise development paradigm, where several different models are developed, going from a very abstract view of the real-world system to a more concrete view. In this way, three specifications of generic state transition system models were developed. The first is an abstract model capturing the system behaviour, but abstracting away from the explicit communication between the control components. Hence, e.g. a reservation event is treated as an atomic event, abstracting away from the intermediate steps issuing requests and acknowledgements.
However, it was known from the start that these intermediate steps should later be explicitly modelled. The starting point is thus a stage where there is already an idea of needing event decomposition. This affects the specification of the first model, where the auxiliary functions for checking and updating the state spaces of the control components are divided into functionality for train control computers and switchboxes, respectively.
The second model is developed using event decomposition for collaborative events (i.e. events involving explicit communication between control components) of the first model in order to model the steps of the communication protocols for such events. At this modelling level, the transition rules are specified in a property-oriented manner, resulting in the least restrictive possible behaviour of the system. This allows for several different legal orders of events.
The third model is an example of restricting the second model to a more specific control protocol for each collaborative event, enforcing a specific order of events. This is achieved by restricting the guards of relevant transition rules, such that the corresponding transitions can only be executed in fewer cases. Thus the set of paths of the state transition system of the third model is a subset of that of the second model.
The specified system models are generic, i.e. without any configuration data describing the railway network and the control components with their data. To verify the models by model checking, they must be instantiated with configuration data. The instantiation and verification will be described in Sect. 7, while the generic models will be explained in Sects. 4, 5, and 6. The instantiated models for all the configurations we consider in later sections can be found online. 3
First generic model
The specification of the first (generic) model can be divided into several different parts:
• Types and values for the static configuration data.
• Types and state variables for the dynamic control component data.
• Functions for describing wellformedness of static configuration data.
• Functions for describing state invariants for dynamic control component data.
• Functions for describing the safety of the system. • Guard and state updater functions.
• Transition system rules.
In addition there are verification obligations, which are specified as test cases and as LTL assertions, which use the functions for describing wellformedness of the static configuration data and the functions for describing state invariants for dynamic control component data and for safety. The following sections will elaborate on the different parts of the generic model and show examples of the specification of test cases and LTL assertions using the aforementioned functions. Further details on the verification of the test cases and LTL assertions can be found in Sects. 7.1.3 and 7.1.4, respectively.
Static configuration data
The static configuration data consist of data describing the railway network under consideration as well as route information for each train running in the network.
Network data
The data for the railway network includes information about which segments and switchboxes appear in the network and how the layout (relative placement) of these is. The data also includes information about which trains run in the network. The network layout data is included in the models solely for the purpose of being able to verify the consistency of the control component data (i.e. routes, reservations, etc.) with respect to the network layout.
Unique identifiers for segments, switchboxes, and trains of the system are given by types. These are not further specified in the generic model, but are intended to be defined by variant types enumerating the concrete identifiers when the model is instantiated. Train identifiers must at least include the special value t none and switchbox identifiers must at least include the special value sb none. We specify the subtypes TrainID and SwitchboxID of the train identifier and switchbox identifier types, respectively, which do not contain the special values.
The network layout describing how the segments of the system are connected is given by a value network of an explicitly defined type Network. The network value is not specified further in the generic model, but is intended to be explicitly defined by a constant when the model is instantiated. The network should be represented as the set of all connections (of the form conn(S 1, S 2)) between neighbouring segments S 1, S 2 of the network and all border segments (of the form border (S )) of the network. The network is oriented according to two distinguished destinations, DOWN and UP, such that at each segment there is a uniquely defined direction to reach DOWN and UP, respectively. Driving in the direction from DOWN to UP will be referred to as the up-direction. The opposite direction (i.e. from UP to DOWN) is referred to as the down-direction. We assume that the connections of the network that have the form conn(S 1, S 2) are all given such that they describe the connection in the up-direction. The wellformedness requirements for the network value will be elaborated on in Sect. 4.3. We must also describe how the switchboxes are placed in the network. This is given by a value netSwitchboxes of an explicitly defined type SwitchboxDesc.
type
SwitchboxDesc SwitchboxID → m SwitchboxConnection, SwitchboxConnection :: stem : SegmentID branches : SegmentID-set value netSwitchboxes : SwitchboxDesc
As for the network value, the netSwitchboxes value is not specified further in the generic model, but should be defined by a constant when the model is instantiated. This constant should map each switchbox identifier of the network to a description of what its stem and branch segments are. Recall that a switchbox is associated with a point or an endpoint. For a point, the stem segment refers to the fixed part of the point (for SB 1 in Fig. 1 this corresponds to segment S 1), and the branch segments refer to those segments which the point can switch between (for SB 1 in Fig. 1 this corresponds to the segments S 2 and S 3). A special case is if a switchbox is placed at the joint of just two segments, i.e. there is a fixed connection between two segments (a one-one-link). In this case, there will only be a single "branch" segment, and the switchbox at that point cannot switch direction. An endpoint has only a stem, but no branch segments (for SB 0 in Fig. 1 this means that its stem is the segment S 1 and that its set of branch segments is empty). The wellformedness requirements for the netSwitchboxes value will be elaborated on in Sect. 4.3.
Static control component data
In Sect. 3.1, we introduced the information which train control computers and switchboxes, respectively, must keep track of. Each control component has its own data with fields corresponding to the information shown in Fig. 1 for the train control computers and the switchboxes, respectively.
In this section we show the specification of suitable types for the static fields in the control component data and show the specification of generic constants of these types. Wellformedness requirements for the constants will be described in Sect. 4.3. The specification of suitable types for the dynamic fields in the control component data and specification of generic variables of these types will be shown in Sect. 4.2.
We have the following types for the static information stored in the train control computers:
• The route, which is a sequence of adjacent segments, is modelled as a value in the type, Route, which is a mapping from segment identifiers to segment identifiers, such that, e.g., the route (S 1, S 2, S 4) (for the train T 1 in Fig. 1) is described by the value [S 1 → S 2, S 2 → S 4]. This way of modelling the route was chosen because RSL-SAL does not support lists, which would otherwise have been the natural choice for the type.
type Route SegmentID → m SegmentID
• The switchboxes, which is a sequence of adjacent switchboxes along the route, is modelled as a value in the type, Switchboxes, which is a mapping from switchbox identifiers to switchbox identifiers, similarly to the Route type. This means that the switchbox sequence (SB 1, SB 2, SB 3) (for the train T 1 in Fig. 1 
We declare static values using the types shown above. In the generic model, the values are underspecified, so they must be given values when the model is instantiated.
We use generic constants for modelling the static data of the train control computers. The generic constants have the form value name[t : TrainID ] : type. Note that we are using the marked train identifier type, i.e., the subtype which does not contain the special t none value.
For the train control computers, we have the following generic constants, describing the route and the switchboxes along the route, respectively: 
Dynamic control component data
We show the specification of suitable types for the dynamic fields in the control component data and show the specification of generic variables of these types.
We have the following types for the dynamic information stored in the train control computers:
• The train position, which is described by one or two segments (depending on whether the train is currently crossing a boundary between two segments or not), 4 is modelled as a value in the variant type Position which can either be a single position consisting of a single segment identifier or a double position consisting of two segments.
type Position single(seg : SegmentID) | double(tlseg : SegmentID, hdseg : SegmentID)
• The reservations stored in a train is modelled as a value in the type TReservation, which is a mapping from switchbox identifiers to sets of segment identifiers, such that multiple segments can be reserved by a train at the same switchbox. For each train, the domain of this map will be the set of switchboxes at which the train currently has reservations. This means that the reservation for the train T 1 in Fig. 1 is described by the value
type TReservation SwitchboxID → m SegmentID-set
• The locks stored in a train is modelled as a value in the type TLock, which is a set of switchbox identifiers such that if a switchbox identifier is included in the set, the train has a lock at that particular switchbox. This means that the reservation for the train T 1 in Fig. 1 is described by the value {} (since the train has not acquired any locks yet).
type TLock SwitchboxID -set Similarly, we have types for the information stored in switchboxes:
• The associated sensor's status is modelled as a value in the variant type, SensorState.
type SensorState active | passive
• The current connection of segments at the point of the switchbox is modelled as a value in the variant type Connection already shown above. The current connection for the switchbox SB 1 in Fig. 1 is described by the value conn(S 1, S 3).
type Connection conn(fst : SegmentID, snd : SegmentID) | border(e : SegmentID)
• The reservations stored in a switchbox is modelled as a value in the type SbReservation, which is a mapping from segment identifiers to train identifiers. For each switchbox, the domain of this map will be exactly the set of segments which that switchbox is connected to. The value corresponding to a segment will be the special value t none when no reservation is made. This means that the reservations for the switchbox SB 1 in Fig. 1 is described by the value
type SbReservation SegmentID → m TrainID
• The locks stored in a switchbox is not modelled as a value in any additional type, but just a value in the type TrainID. When no lock is present, the special value t none will be used.
Several state variables are declared in the transition system model using the types shown above. The initial values of these determine the initial state of the transition system. In the generic model, the variables are uninitialised, so they must be given values when the model is instantiated for model checking.
For modelling the dynamic data of each control component, we use generic variables. The generic variables have the form variable name[t : TrainID ] : type and variable name[sb : SwitchboxID ] : type. Note that we are using the marked train and switchbox identifier types, i.e., the subtypes which do not contain the special none values.
For the train control computers, we have the following generic variables, describing the position, the next switchbox 5 (to be passed next or which is currently being passed), the reservations, and the locks, respectively: Similarly, for the switchboxes, we have the following generic variables, describing the sensor value, the connection, the reservations, and the locks, respectively: 
Wellformedness of static configuration data
The static configuration data values for a model instance must adhere to specific requirements to ensure that the data is wellformed. There may be requirements for a value itself, or the requirements may relate the value to the value of other static configuration data.
Because the requirements only deal with static data, we can use static checking (rather than model checking) to verify that the requirements hold for a model instance. The static verification is performed by expressing the wellformedness requirements as test cases and executing those. We will give further details on the static verification in Sect. 7.
Below we will informally describe the wellformedness requirements. In two cases, we will also show how they are expressed formally. For the rest, we will show the name of the test case, such that the reader can find it in the specification files. The specification of test cases is generic such that it can be re-used for different model instances.
Network wellformedness. The network value must be wellformed. Recall that the network is represented as a set of values of the form conn(S 1, S 2) and border (S 1), where a value of the form conn(S 1, S 2) indicates that the segments S 1 and S 2 are neighbours in the up-direction.
For the network it must hold that (1) the network is non-empty;
(2) the network has no loops; 6 (3) each border segment must have at least one neighbour segment; (4) all neighbour segments of a border segment must be on the same side of the border segment; and (5) each non-border segment in the network must have at least one neighbour in each direction. This can be expressed by the test case:
where the function network wf is specified as follows:
using several auxiliary functions: no loops checks for loops in the network; conns of net extracts all connections which are not border segments from the network; is fst in conn and is snd in conn check whether a segment is the first, respectively second, component of some connection which is not a border segment; and segments of conn extracts the segments from a Connection value.
Consistency between net switchboxes and network.
The netSwitchboxes value must be consistent with the network value: It must hold that (1) for each switchbox it describes, each branch segment is a neighbour to the stem in the network; and (2) for each pair of adjacent segments and each border segment in the network, there is one and only one matching switchbox in netSwitchboxes in terms of stem and branch segments.
In a way similar to above, this is expressed by a test case named cons sb desc net using a function cons sb desc net : SwitchboxDesc × Network → Bool.
Consistency between train routes and network.
For each train t, its train route (map) in the route [ t ] value must represent a sequence of adjacent segments in the network value: as the route is represented as a map, the invariant can be checked by checking that (1) the domain of the map has exactly one more segment s 1 than the range and the range of the map has exactly one more segment s n than the domain (such that the map represents a linear sequence of distinct segments s 1 , . . ., s n , where s i+1 route[t](s i ) for i = 1, . . ., n-1) and that (2) each segment is mapped to a neighbour segment in the network. This can be expressed by the test case: where the function cons route network is specified as follows:
6 Anti-symmetry is a consequence of this requirement. 
State invariants
There are several state invariants which should hold for the values of the control components' state variables in each model instance. The values in the state variables must be mutually consistent (i.e. in agreement), and the values must be consistent with the static configuration data as well. We will give further details on the verification of invariants in Sect. 7. Below we will informally describe the state invariants we have considered. For one of the invariants, we will also show how it is expressed formally as an LTL formula. For the rest, we will show the name of the invariant, such that the reader can find it in the specification files. The specification of state invariants is generic such that it can be re-used for different model instances. The first seven invariants express internal consistency between different variables and between variables and constants of each train control computer, the next invariant expresses that the state of each train control computer must be consistent with the network data, the following two invariants express that the state of each switchbox must be consistent with the network data, and the three last invariants express mutual consistency between the states of train control computers and the states of switchboxes.
Consistency between train position and reservations.
For each train, t, its reservations, tReservations [ t ], must be consistent with its position, pos [ t ] , such that the train has the necessary reservations for legally being in its current position: a train in a single position should always at least have a reservation for its current segment at its next switchbox, and a train in a double position should always at least have a reservation for each of its current segments at the next switchbox (which is the one it is passing) along with a reservation for its front-most segment at the switchbox after its next switchbox. This can be expressed by the formula: Consistency between train position and locks. For each train, t, its locks, tLocks[t ], must be consistent with its position, pos [ t ] , such that the train at least has the necessary lock for legally being in its current position: a train in a single position does not need to have any locks, but a train in a double position should always at least Consistency between train locks and switchbox locks. For each train, t, its locks, tLocks[t ], must be mutually consistent with the locks saved in each of the switchboxes' state spaces, sbLock[sb]: if a train has a lock for a switchbox, then the switchbox must be locked for that train; and if a switchbox is locked for a train, then that train has a lock for that switchbox. 8 This is expressed in the LTL assertion named cons locks.
Consistency between train position and switchbox sensor. For each train, t, the sensor, sbSensor[sb], of its next switchbox, sb = nextSb[t ], must be consistent with the train position, pos[ t ]: if a train's position is a double position, then the sensor associated with the train's next switchbox should be active. This is expressed in the LTL assertion named cons sensor pos.
Safety invariants
The safety invariants for the system are specified in a similar manner to the other state invariants. We will give further details on the verification of the safety invariants in Sect. 7. 
Guard and state updater functions
The guard and state updater functions are used when specifying the transition system. They are used in the transition system rules, where each rule consists of a guard and a collection of effects, i.e. state updates. An example of a guard function is t can reserve , which is used to determine, from the point of view of a train, whether a reservation of a specific segment at a specific switchbox can be made. This should be the case if the train is in a single position; the train has not already made the same reservation; the switchbox is one of the switchboxes along the train's route; and the segment to be reserved is a segment in the train's route. The parameters of the guard function are the position of the train (pos), the train's switchboxes (switchboxes), the train's route (route), the train's reservations (res), the segment to be reserved (seg) and the switchbox at which to make the reservation (sb). Another example of a guard function is sb can reserve , which is used to determine, from the point of view of a switchbox, whether a reservation can be made. This should be the case if the switchbox is associated with the segment to be reserved and the segment is not reserved already by any train at the switchbox. 
Transition system rules
The rules of the transition system define the possible events (state transitions) of the system. In this first model, for each collaborative event e, there is a rule of the following form: The Reserve collection contains a single rule for reserving a segment seg for a train t at a switchbox sb. [ As can be seen, two guard functions are used to determine whether the reservation can be made: only if both the train and the switchbox agree, the event can take place. The effect of the rule is specified using two updater functions to update the reservations of both the train and the switchbox in question.
The Lock collection contains a single rule for switching and locking a point associated with a switchbox sb in a connection con for a train t.
[Lock] (( sb : SwitchboxID , t : TrainID , con : The rule uses two guard functions to determine whether the point can be switched to the desired connection and subsequently locked in this position. As for reservations, the switchbox and train must agree on the legality of the event. The effect of the rule uses two updater functions to update the locks of the train and switchbox, respectively. In addition, the current connection of the switchbox (sbConnection) is updated to the desired connection.
The Move collection contains two rules: one for moving a train when it is in a single position and one for moving the train when it is in a double position. Move is not a collaborative event, so it does not follow the same pattern as the rules for reserving and locking. In the first rule, move single to double, we use a guard function to determine whether the train is allowed to move. Note that there is only a guard function for the train, as movement legality is determined solely from a train's local state space. It is also checked that the switchbox from the quantification (sb) is equal to the train's next switchbox, as the effects of the rule should only take place in this case. If the guard holds, we can make the updates to the train's position and to the sensor, which will become active (i.e., detecting something).
In the second rule we do not call any guard function, as a train will always have a correct reservation when it has been allowed to move partly onto the next segment (corresponding to the front segment of the train). The guard for the rule has the same check for the train's next switchbox as in the guard for the first rule.
In the effects of the rule, several variables are updated, changing the trains position and next switchbox, making the sensor passive (i.e., not detecting anything), and releasing reservations and locks in the train state space and the switchbox state space (cf. the explanation of the Engineering Concept in Sect. 3.1).
Note that there is an indirect communication from the train to the switchbox via the sensor associated with the switchbox: When a train passes a sensor, the sensor changes state, and as there is a wired connection between the sensor and its associated switchbox, a change in the sensor state is considered as being registered immediately in the switchbox' sensor variable. And immediately when the switchbox' sensor becomes passive (i.e. in the moment when a train has fully passed the sensor), the switchbox' reservation and lock variables are updated. Hence, the two move rules above include updates of the sbSensor [sb] variable, and the second rule additionally includes updates of the sbReservations[sb] variable and the sbLock [sb] variable.
Second generic model
In the second step, the model has been refined to explicitly model a communication scheme between the control components of the system.
The collaborative events of the system (reservation and locking) are decomposed into multiple sub-events, such that a simple request-acknowledge protocol scheme is modelled. The event refinement has been chosen to be atomic (i.e. all the sub-events of an event have to be completed before a new event can happen) in order to keep the state space as small as possible. It can be shown that removing the atomicity requirements from the resulting model M 2 leads to a model M 2 which is behaviourally equivalent to M 2 with respect to the externally (physical) observable state, i.e. train positions and point positions. This is because the internal protocol states of different communication events are disjoint, so that every set of interleaved communication transactions has an outcome which is equivalent to that of a serialised execution of the same transactions in some specific order. Hence, any safety conditions proved for M 2 will also hold for M 2 .
In contrast to the reservation and locking events, the move event does not include an explicit communication scheme between the control components, where requests and acknowledgements are sent from and to the control components. As previously explained, a train's movement indirectly affects a switchbox' sensor variable, which in turn affects the switchbox' reservations and locks. The change of the sensor variable is viewed as instant since there is a wired connection between the physical sensor and the switchbox. After the change to the sensor variable, the variables for the switchbox' reservations and lock are updated almost immediately (within one hundred milliseconds which is at a significantly higher speed than the train's velocity). It would be possible to decompose the second move rule, move double to single into two separate rules (representing two consecutive sub-events): rule (1) which only updates the sensor variable and the train's variables, and rule (2) which, based on the change in the sensor variable, updates the reservations and lock variables of the switchbox. However, since the second event happens so quickly, we consider it as happening instantly and have therefore chosen not to decompose the move double to single rule.
In the communication protocols for the collaborative events, the train control computers are the initiating party, issuing requests to the switchboxes. When a switchbox receives a request, it decides whether it is able to comply with the request and, depending on this, sends either a positive or negative acknowledgement to the train. If the switchbox can comply with the request, it will also update its state space accordingly. Similarly, when a train control computer receives a positive acknowledgement, it will update its state space accordingly. If the switchbox cannot comply with the request, neither the state space of the switchbox nor of the train control computer will be updated.
To model the communication between the control components, the collaborative events of the system have been decomposed in the following manner. For each collaborative event e, the single transition rule in the first model is now replaced with several separate sub-rules:
• train request e, which is the initiation of the event. This corresponds to a train control computer issuing a request to a specific switchbox with any relevant information for the event in question. • switchbox ack e, which is the positive acknowledgement rule for the switchbox. This corresponds to the switchbox accepting the request, changing its own state space accordingly and issuing the positive acknowledgement to the train control computer in question. • train e ack, which concludes the event. This corresponds to the train control computer receiving the positive acknowledgement signal from the switchbox and updating its own state space accordingly. • switchbox nack e, which is the negative acknowledgement rule for the switchbox. This corresponds to the switchbox not being able to comply with the request, and therefore issuing a negative acknowledgement to the train control computer in question. • train e nack is an auxiliary action for "consuming" the negative acknowledgement from a switchbox and not changing the state space of the train control computer.
To keep track of the messages sent between the control components, several variables have been added to the model:
Interface variables are used to record whether a message is a request, an acknowledgement or a negative acknowledgement, and to record who the sender and receiver are: For instance, ack [sb] t models a positive acknowledgement from a switchbox sb to a train t. ack [sb] t none models that no positive acknowledgement has been sent from a switchbox sb to a train t. Data variables are used for storing data sent as part of a request. For example, for a reservation request, the following variable 9 is used to store the segment to be reserved: reqSeg : SegmentID Event variables are used to keep track of which type of the collaborative events is currently ongoing (if any). There is a Boolean variable for each kind of collaborative event. For example, for the reservation event, the following variable is used: 10 reserveEvent : Bool
The variable is set to true whenever a train control computer requests a reservation of a segment at some switchbox, and set to false when the train control computer has received an acknowledgement (either positive or negative).
As an example of how the new rules of the transition system are specified and how the additional variables are used, consider the Reserve rules for requesting, acknowledging and concluding the reservation event: 
)
The train request reservation rule can be applied when the system is idle, i.e. when no events are ongoing, 11 when the train control computer has not already sent a request and when the reservation is legal from the train control computer's point of view. As its effect, the rule sets the request variable for the train identifier and switchbox identifier in question, sets a data variable to the segment to be reserved and enables the reservation event variable.
The switchbox ack reservation rule can be applied when the reservation event variable is enabled, a request has been issued, and the reservation event is legal from the point of view of the switchbox. As its effect, the rule issues a positive acknowledgement, removes the issued request and updates the state space of the switchbox with the reservation (here, the segment data variable from before is used).
Finally, the train reserve ack rule can be applied when the reservation event variable is enabled and a positive acknowledgement has been received. As its effect, the rule updates the state space of the train control computer (and again uses the segment data variable), removes the acknowledgement and disables the reservation event variable.
There are two additional rules (not shown here) for expressing the sending of a negative acknowledgement from a switchbox to a train and for the train receiving it, respectively.
For the lock event there is a similar set of rules for the communication between the train control computers and the switchboxes.
As the move event does not include explicit communication between the control components and should not be decomposed, as explained in the start of the section, the rules for this event are identical to those of the first model.
Relation to the first model.
Instances of this model are clearly able to simulate all possible events of the corresponding instances of the first generic model, which was the intention with this step in which no behaviour should be lost. Furthermore, instances of the first model are able to simulate all atomic events of the corresponding instances of this second generic model.
Third generic model
The third model has been restricted to model a just-in-time allocation principle. In the previous models, any order of legal events was possible. This means, for example, that nothing was preventing a train from reserving the last segment of its route as the first event (other than if the segment was already reserved, of course). This third model should now specify a control strategy, stating that a train must only make reservations of the next upcoming segment in its route (at the two upcoming switchboxes of its route), and must only lock the point at the next upcoming switchbox. This strategy is just one of many choices, and is used to demonstrate the possibility and technique of restricting the protocol of the second model to enforce events to happen in a more specific order.
As mentioned, the train control computers are the initiating party for collaborative events. Therefore, the desired restriction can be achieved by strengthening the guard functions used by the train control computers. This limits the amount of possible events such that they match the steps of the control strategy.
The restriction of the guard functions is accomplished by using the following pattern. If the guard function was previously of the form In this case it turned out that some of the added sub-properties imply some of the sub-properties in t can reserve (pos, switchboxes , route , res , seg , sb), so we simplified the conjunction.
The transition rule for train request reservation is obtained from the second model by replacing t can reserve(pos [ 
t], switchboxes[t], route[t], tReservations[t], seg, sb) with t can reserve restricted(pos[t], nextSb[t], switchboxes[t], route[t], tReservations[t], seg, sb). Likewise, the transition rule for train request lock is obtained by replacing t can lock(pos[t], c, route[t], switchboxes[t], tReservations[t], sb, tLocks[t]) with t can lock restricted(pos[t], nextSb[t], c, route[t], switchboxes[t], tReservations[t], sb, tLocks[t]).
Relation to second model.
Instances of the second model can clearly simulate all possible behaviours of the corresponding instances of this third generic model.
Verification
This section describes our verification method, consisting of (1) the verification activities performed during the stepwise development of a generic model and (2) the verification activities performed after the generic model was fully developed.
Verification activities during development
A part of the stepwise development method for the generic models is to verify the models at each step. The main goal of this verification is to gain confidence in the correctness of the generic models. The models must be instantiated to allow for verification. The steps for verifying a model at one of the development steps are as follows:
1. Instantiate the model with configuration data. 2. Verify wellformedness of the configuration data using static verification. 12 3. Verify properties, including the safety invariants, of the model instance using model checking.
In Sect. 7.1.2, we show how a generic model can be instantiated with concrete data. Then, in Sect. 7.1.3, we give details on the verification of the wellformedness of the configuration data using the test cases which were introduced in Sect. 4.3. In Sect. 7.1.4, we give details on the verification of properties using model checking.
Since the intention is that the final generic model can be instantiated with different configurations which are not known at the time of specification, during the development we perform the verification on instantiations of fragments of typical configurations where wrong behaviour of the control system could lead to unsafe states.
Reasons for verifying at each development step
It should be noted that we have not formally verified a formal refinement/simulation relation between the models, which would require considerably higher verification effort, but only discussed this informally in the previous sections.
Therefore, we perform the verification of properties for each instance of the model at each development step in order to gain confidence in the correctness of the generic models. Even if invariant properties for a model instance of the first generic model has been model checked, we need to model check them again for the corresponding instance of the second generic model as there are new intermediate states we want to be sure are safe. In principle, the model checking of invariant properties for a model instance of the third generic model should not be necessary when they have been model checked for the corresponding instance of the second generic model (as all behaviours of the third model are simulated by behaviours in the second model), but since we made some simplifications of the guards in the third generic model, we also model check the properties for the model instance of the third model.
Performing the verification of properties of the model at each development step has the advantage that the first generic model is much less complex than the second and third generic model. Therefore, it is beneficial to verify invariants already at this first development step, because the model checking process is quicker, which means that we can discover possible errors already at this early point of the development.
Example of instantiation
In Fig. 2 we illustrate a small configuration, which corresponds to a fragment of a typical configuration where two trains driving in opposite directions must pass through the same station. The two trains are shown in their initial position and the lines show their routes (the striped train's route is shown as a dashed line, whereas the black train's route is shown as a solid line). The initial connections of the two points are shown by thick lines. We will now show how to instantiate the generic models with data corresponding to this fragment. Instantiations of the three generic models with the configuration data for the configuration shown in Fig. 2 are available online. 13 The network configuration data for this instance is as follows: For some of the generic variables, all instances must be initialised to the same value. For example, since both trains start in a single position, all sensors' initial status are passive. This can be specified by using a quantified constraint as follows: init constraint (∀sb : SwitchboxID • sbSensor[sb] passive)
Configuration data checking
In Sect. 4.3, we introduced wellformedness and consistency requirements for the network configuration data and static data of the train control computers. Because the data is static, the requirements on the data can be statically verified. 14 Static verification is carried out by specifying (generic) test cases once-and-for-all as explained in Sect. 4.3, and then for each configuration example unfolding and translating the test cases to SML, and running SML to get the results of each test case. Running SML on the unfolded and translated test cases results in a truth-value for each test case describing whether the specified property holds for the given configuration data. For example, assuming that the network value is indeed wellformed, the result of the test network wf (shown in Sect. 4.3) would be shown as follows:
Model checking
In Sects. 4.4 and 4.5 we introduced (generic) consistency invariants and safety invariants, respectively, for the dynamic control component data. In addition to these invariants, we have also expressed (generic) progress properties that will be explained below. For a model instance, these invariant properties and progress properties can be verified by model checking. Progress properties. The progress properties state that the system progresses, i.e. that something good eventually happens.
We have expressed properties (only relevant for the second and third model) stating that decomposed collaborative events are always completed. For example, the fact that the reservation event is always completed is stated as follows:
[ finish reserve ] G(resEvent ⇒ F(¬resEvent)) Note that model checking results for properties of the above form are only sound if there are no deadlocks, so before checking these properties, the SAL deadlock checker should be run.
We also consider the progress property that there is at least one possible schedule where all trains reach their destination. This property can be verified by contradiction: by model checking properties stating that the trains do not all eventually arrive at their destination: where t is at end (route[t], pos[t]) expresses that the train's position is a single position with the segment corresponding to the last segment in its route. This property is expected to be false for admissible configurations and should generate a counter example showing a trace where all trains arrive at their destination. This property is interesting as it is possible to create model instances where any system run will lead to a livelock preventing some trains from reaching their destination, e.g. for the very simple configuration example shown in Fig. 4 . 15 For such a configuration, it would not be possible to create any schedule, as there are no system runs where both trains are able to reach their respective destinations. Such cases cannot be found by the deadlock checker (as there is no deadlock), but can be found by checking the not all trains arrive property. If this produces a counterexample, then there does indeed exist a possible schedule where all the trains arrive as desired. With no counterexample, however, there does not exist any trace allowing all the trains to reach their destination, i.e. there are no possible schedules. Even if a configuration is admissible, one should not expect that all trains arrive at their destination in any possible trace. This is for instance the case for the configurations shown in Figs. 2 and 3 . 16 The reason is that the control algorithms specified in the models do not ensure fairness for the trains (in the sense that every train will repeatedly, until it reaches its destination, receive permission to move onto the next segment after a bounded number of tries of making the needed reservations and locks). Ensuring such fairness is instead a task for the train scheduler. 17 During the train scheduling, it is checked that the timetables constructed by the scheduler are feasible, allowing trains to reach their destination without blocking each other's possibility to advance as in the livelock scenario described above, cf. [HH19].
Choice of examples
In this section we will present the example configurations for which we during the model development have performed the verification activities presented in Sects. 7.1.3 and 7.1.4 in order to gain confidence in the correctness of the developed models.
The network layouts and train routes of the examples were primarily chosen such that they include critical cases for which there is a potential risk of train collisions or derailments. More specifically, the network layouts and train routes were chosen such that they include (1) cases where two trains have overlapping routes such that there is a potential risk of a collision between the two trains on a common track segment, (2) cases where a train should pass a point which is in a wrong position so there is a risk of derailment (if it is not able to switch and lock the point in correct position before it moves over the point) and (3) cases where two trains require the same point to be switched in different positions to pass the point such that there is a potential risk of a derailment. In the railway domain, it is generally accepted that it is sufficient to consider two trains to check for collisions as there is no possibility of a three train collision without a two-train collision first, and it is enough to consider one train passing a point to check for derailments over that point cf. [Fan12] and [JMN + 14b] . However, we also check for derailments when there are two trains requiring conflicting point positions to be sure that a train lock made by one train is not overruled by another train.
We only considered configurations where trains driving in opposite directions are using distinct track sections through the stations, i.e. where trains driving in the up-direction at all stations use the tracks on one side and trains driving in the down-direction use the tracks on the other side, because these are the characteristics of the real-world systems for which the final generic model should later be configured.
Risk of collision.
For a collision to take place, two trains must enter the same segment(s) in the network. This can only happen if the two trains were previously on adjacent segments. First we consider two cases where the adjacent segments have a fixed connection (a one-one-link) and then four cases where there is a switchable connection (a point) between the adjacent segments: Figs. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, respectively, show different cases where there is a potential risk of collision between the two trains if they are allowed to move to their next segments (in their route) as follows:
1. For the case shown in Fig. 4 : if any of the two trains begin entering their next segment. 
Risk of derailment.
For a derailment to take place in a one-train scenario a train must drive over a point which is switched in the wrong direction, or a point must be switched while the train is passing that point. The first kind of derailment can only happen if the train was previously driving towards a point on one of the point's branching segments and the point was switched to connect the stem with the other branch segment, as illustrated in Fig. 10 . The second kind of derailment can only happen if the train was previously passing a point in correct position, as illustrated in Fig. 11.  Fig. 11 . A single train passing a point. Figs. 7 and 9 , respectively, as the associated model instances include some system runs that reach the two desired configurations, respectively. 18 Lastly, Fig. 16 covers the cases shown in Figs. 10 and 11 . It should be noted that the configuration in Fig. 16 can only be used to check for freedom of derailments of a train over a point which is not affected by other trains, while the configurations in Figs. 13 and 15 can be used to check for freedom of derailments in the case where two trains need the same point in different positions. While the selected configuration examples include the critical cases that we wish to investigate, Fig. 13 in particular also includes the very common situation of two trains driving in opposite directions passing each other at a station. Similarly, Fig. 15 includes the situation of two trains driving in opposite directions "competing" to pass an open line between two stations. For these realistic configurations it is interesting not only to check for safety, but also to check that there is a schedule where the trains can pass each other and reach their destination.
Stepwise development of interlocking systems Figure 16 also includes a common situation where a train must pass a station with no other trains near it. For this configuration it is similarly interesting to check that the train is able to reach its destination.
Model instances for the seven selected configurations can be found online. 19
Verification results
We have successfully statically verified all the desired wellformedness and consistency requirements (as explained in Sect. 7.1.3) for each of the seven configuration examples selected in Sect. 7.1.5 and model checked all the desired state invariants and progress properties for the corresponding model instances (as explained in Sect. 7.1.4). In particular, the property not all trains arrive gave for the five configurations in Figs. 12, 13 , 14, 15 and 16 as desired, rise to a counter example demonstrating that there exists at least one schedule, where all trains arrive at their destination, while it, as expected, did not give rise to a counter example for the configurations in Figs. 4 and 5.
Below we present verification metrics for the model instances (of each the three generic models) for each of the two configurations shown in Figs. 13 and 15 , while the verification metrics for the remaining examples we have considered can be found online. 20 These two configurations were chosen to be presented in the paper as they are representative and were those that took the most time and memory to model check. One of the reasons for the latter is the fact that the train routes in these are longer than the train routes in the other configurations. Table 1 shows metrics for the size of the configuration data: the number of segments, points, switchboxes, and trains in the network, as well as the route lengths of the trains. These metrics determine, as shown in Table 2 , how many variables and transition rules the unfolded model instances have. For each of the configurations, the number of variables and number transition rules in the corresponding instance of the first model differ from those of the corresponding instances of the second and third models because of the extra variables introduced due to the decomposition of events. The number of variables might not appear to be very high, but recall that many of the variables have complex types (e.g. map types) allowing for quite many possible values. Table 3 shows for each of the selected model instances, intervals for the time and memory consumption for model checking any of the properties with the SAL model checker, version 3.3. The results were measured using GNU Time 21 on a machine with a Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-8650U CPU @ 1.90 GHz and 31GiB of memory. We present the time and memory usage as an interval for proving any property rather than presenting the exact numbers for each property separately as these numbers were very similar. 22 The interested reader can find all the raw data online 23 . Figure 13 Model 1 24 178 Model 2/3 38 242 Figure 15 Model 1 32 386 Model 2/3 50 482 The bar charts in Fig. 17 show the time taken to model check the no collide property for the model instances of the first, second, and third model (M 1, M 2, and M 3, respectively) for each of the two selected configurations. It is a general pattern for all the instances we have verified that it takes less time to verify properties of instances of the first model than of instances of the other models (for the same configuration). This is not surprising, as the instances of the first model have both fewer variables and fewer transition rules. There is no general pattern for whether the instances of the third model take less time to verify than the instances of the second model (for the same configuration)-for some configurations it takes less time and for others it takes a longer time, as can be seen in the two bar-charts of Fig. 17 .
The bar charts in Fig. 18 show the memory consumption during the model checking of the no collide property for the model instances of the first, second and third model for each of the two selected configurations. Similar to the time taken to verify the property, it is a general pattern that the verification of instances of the first model consume less memory than instances of the second and third model. Comparing the memory consumption for verifying instances of the second model and instances of the third model does not give rise to a general pattern. For the instances of the configurations shown in Figs. 13 and 15 , the third model requires less memory in both cases, but for other instances (e.g. for the configurations shown in Figs. 12 and 14) the second model requires less memory.
Verification of real-world systems
After the final (third) generic model has been developed, it can be instantiated with configuration data representing real-world railway systems to be verified. Safety verification of such instances can be done in a similar manner to the verification done during the development. First, the wellformedness of the static configuration data should be statically verified. Then, ideally, the safety properties should be verified by performing model checking on the associated model instance. However, instantiating the third generic model with data corresponding to a real-world system will often lead to state explosion problems, since adding stations and trains to the line may result in exponential growth of the state space to be investigated by the model checker, even though the network topology is quite trivial. In this case, a possibility may be to use a combination of model checking of smaller fragments of a system and compositional reasoning [FHM17, LCPT16] . The RELIS 2000 system was intended for local railways with 10-20 stations with 1-2 track segments each connected by single lines and operated by 2-3 trains. Instantiating the third generic model with data corresponding to systems of this size resulted in memory exhaustion. Therefore, as will be explained below, we model checked smaller fragments common to all configurations of the considered class of local railways and used compositional reasoning for arguing for the safety of system instances (of the third model) for such local railways. As can be seen from the case analysis below, compositional reasoning is quite simple for the type of railway network layouts considered in this article.
Verification of two-train configurations
For the considered local railways, a typical initial state is the one illustrated in Fig. 19 , where two trains are driving in opposite directions from either end of a network with routes that use distinct track sections through the stations (such that they can pass there). We will now argue by case analysis for the safety of systems having these characteristics.
As the third model is using the just-in-time allocation principle, the two trains will initially not communicate with the same switchboxes. We will now consider two cases: firstly, the case where the two trains still are in positions where they do not communicate with the same switchboxes, and then, the case where the trains are close enough to each other to communicate with the same switchboxes.
For the first case, we have already shown for the configuration in Fig. 16 , that a train is able to safely pass a station even if the points are initially in the wrong position compared to the train's route. Therefore, it can also safely pass several stations until it reaches the zone of influence of another train.
We now analyse the system to find configurations corresponding to the earliest possible time where the two trains may interact with the same switchboxes, and thereby the earliest point that the trains' reservations and locks may interfere with each other.
Figures 20 and 21 show for two different positions of the black train, the earliest point of the striped train at which the two trains can interact with the same switchbox. The switchboxes that each train may communicate with are marked in the train's corresponding line type (i.e. dashed for the striped train and solid for the black train). Since the two situations are included in the system runs of the model instance for the configuration illustrated in Fig. 22 , it is sufficient to verify that configuration. Note that the configuration where the striped train has moved one segment further (i.e. is inside the left-most station) and the black train has not yet (fully) entered the right-most station (i.e. is fully or partially on the line to the right of the right station) is equivalent to the two cases shown in Figs. 20 and 21, so we do not need to also verify another configuration capturing these cases. Note that the situations where the trains are closer to each other than shown in Fig. 21 (and thus still may communicate with some of the same switchboxes) are also included in the configuration illustrated in Fig. 22 . The safety properties of an instance of the third model for the configuration shown in Fig. 22 were successfully verified, and the not all trains arrive property was (as expected) false. Therefore, we can conclude that two trains can safely pass each other. This concludes the case analysis for this kind of two-train configurations.
Verification of three-train configurations
In some local railways, a third train may be placed roughly in the middle between the two end-destinations as shown in Fig. 23 . This means that two trains may be going in the same direction, so we need additionally to analyse a third case. (Even though the trains in the considered local railways are supposed not to be so close that they can interfere and thereby constitute a risk of collisions, we still wish to verify the safety for a case where the rear train is catching up on the front train and gets into the zone where it can interfere with the front train as this could happen in the case of irregularities, e.g. if the front train had a break down). Figures 24 and 25 shows for four different positions of the (black) front train, the earliest point of the (striped) rear train at which the two trains can interact with the same switchbox. Since the four situations (and any situations where the trains are closer to each other) are included in the system runs of the model instance for the configuration illustrated in Fig. 26 , it is sufficient to verify that configuration. The safety properties of an instance of the third model for this configuration were successfully verified, and the not all trains arrive property was false as expected. Therefore, we can conclude that two trains can safely drive behind each other when they are in each other's influence zone. Fig. 24 . Two cases where two trains driving in the same direction can communicate with the same switchbox: the black train is either fully or partially at the station. In addition, having a third train in the network means that there are cases where all three trains are close enough that they can communicate with the same switchbox. The configuration illustrated in Fig. 27 includes the two main situations where the three trains (two of them driving in the same direction) can all communicate with the same switchbox. The first of these situations is the one where the dotted train has moved fully onto segment s6. In this case, the three trains can all communicate with switchbox SB 2. The second situation is the one where the black train and the striped train have each moved one segment forward, i.e. onto segment s4 and segment s2, respectively. In this case, the three trains can all communicate with switchbox SB 3. The safety properties of an instance of the third model for this configuration were successfully verified, and the not all trains arrive property was false as expected. Therefore, we can conclude that three trains can operate safely when they are in each other's influence zone.
Verification metrics
In Table 4 , we show the numbers for the configuration data size of the configurations shown in Figs. 22, 26 and 27. In Table 5 the resulting number of variables and transition rules of the unfolded model instances of the third model are shown. Finally, in Table 6 , we present the time and memory consumption for the verification of the safety properties for the instances of the third model corresponding to the configurations shown in Figs. 22, 26 and 27, respectively. 
Other verification activities
Before beginning the process of symbolic model checking model instances against the desired properties, other tools were used to gain confidence in the correctness of the function and transition system rule specifications.
• Testing of functions: As one of the first activities during the model development, important functions (e.g. for expressing safety and consistency properties, which are used in the transition system assertions) were tested once using the RSL test case construct. The functions were validated to ensure that the assertions to be verified in the model checking process are correct. This testing activity was only needed in the first specification step, as no new functions were used in the later steps. For example, we tested the function for checking the consistency between train reservations and train position, cons res pos(tReservations [ t ] , pos[ t ] , nextSb[t ] , switchboxes[ t ]) (shown in Sect. 4.4). The validation of the function was achieved by testing different cases, for example the following, where sb1, sb2, sb3, s1 and s2 are concrete values:
-Train reservations and position which are expected to be consistent.
[ tc1 ] cons res pos( [sb1 → {s1,s2}, sb2 → {s2}], double(s1,s2 ), sb1, {sb1 → sb2, sb2 → sb3])
-Train reservations and position which are expected to be inconsistent.
[ tc2 ] cons res pos( [sb1 → {s1,s2}], double(s1,s2 ), sb1, {sb1 → sb2, sb2 → sb3])
• Bounded model checking: The model instances were tested using the SAL bounded model checker, which only explores the paths in the transition system to a certain, given depth. Therefore, attempting to verify the properties stated above with the bounded model checker reveals bugs much faster, than when using the global model checker.
For a given model instance, one can decide on a suitable depth for discovering bugs by counting the (expected) number of transitions at least needed for all the trains to reach their final destination. For example, for the instance of the third model obtained by using the configuration shown in Fig. 2 , the striped train must make a reservation of segment s2 at sb1 and sb2 (6 transitions), then lock sb1 (3 transitions), and then move to segment s2 (2 transitions). For the black train, a similar set of transitions must be made (possibly interleaved with the above mentioned transitions of the striped train) for it to enter segment s3. Both the striped train and the black train must then again make a similar set of transitions for reaching their respective next segments, s4 and s1. This gives in total 44 transitions that must at least be made for the trains to be able to reach their final destination for the configuration in Fig. 2 , and thus, in this case we would choose 44 as the depth for the bounded model checker.
Conclusion and future work
In this paper we have shown a method to stepwise develop a generic state transition system model of a real-world distributed railway interlocking system and verify safety properties and other properties of instances of these models by model checking. This method could also carry over to other, similar applications. Although stepwise refinement of state transition systems is well known from other languages, it is novel for RSL. The models are expressed in a new extension to RSL and RSL-SAL [PG07]: RSL , which has also been presented. This extension provides language constructs that better facilitate the specification of generic systems.
The stepwise development has shown to be very useful: Firstly, it allows the initial specification to abstract away from details and complexity which can be added later in a development step. This means that a simpler model expressing essential system behaviour can be developed first without worrying about concrete details. This eases the modelling process. It also has the advantage that essential system behaviour can be verified already at this stage, allowing the developer to gain confidence in the specification, before adding details. Secondly, the idea of letting the second model be so general (e.g. without having a restriction on the ordering of reservations that a train should send) that it can be refined to several different concrete behaviours (e.g. with specific orderings of reservations) by restricting the guards is useful as the invariant properties which are shown to be satisfied by the general model will also be satisfied by any restrictions. In this way one can create a library of different families of models, and variants of different control protocols can be explored and compared.
For the model checking, the SAL symbolic model checker was used, just for a proof of concept of our method, but other back-ends can be used as well.
The RSL-SAL model checker back-end could handle small networks, but not large networks. Therefore, in future work we plan to experiment with other model checking techniques, e.g. SAT-based k-induction, and other back-ends, e.g. RT-Tester [Ver13] , in order to find an efficient verification technique that scales better up such that compositional reasoning reasoning would not be needed. In another case study [VHP17] , RT-Tester was used to perform k-induction in order to prove a centralised interlocking system and turned out to be very efficient and scale up to big networks. So we believe that this could also be the case for the system considered in this paper.
